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Abstract
Collaborative functionality is an increasingly prevalent web technology. To encourage participation, these
systems usually have low barriers-to-entry and permissive privileges. Unsurprisingly, ill-intentioned users try
to leverage these characteristics for nefarious purposes. In this work, a particular abuse is examined -- link
spamming -- the addition of promotional or otherwise inappropriate hyperlinks.
Our analysis focuses on the "wiki" model and the collaborative encyclopedia, Wikipedia, in particular. A
principal goal of spammers is to maximize *exposure*, the quantity of people who view a link. Creating and
analyzing the first Wikipedia link spam corpus, we find that existing spam strategies perform quite poorly in
this regard. The status quo spamming model relies on link persistence to accumulate exposures, a strategy that
fails given the diligence of the Wikipedia community. Instead, we propose a model that exploits the latency
inherent in human anti-spam enforcement.
Statistical estimation suggests our novel model would produce significantly more link exposures than status
quo techniques. More critically, the strategy could prove economically viable for perpetrators, incentivizing its
exploitation. To this end, we address mitigation strategies.
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ABSTRACT
Collaborative functionality is an increasingly prevalent web
technology. To encourage participation, these systems usu-
ally have low barriers-to-entry and permissive privileges.
Unsurprisingly, ill-intentioned users try to leverage these
characteristics for nefarious purposes. In this work, a par-
ticular abuse is examined – link spamming – the addition of
promotional or otherwise inappropriate hyperlinks.
Our analysis focuses on the wiki model and the collabora-
tive encyclopedia, Wikipedia, in particular. A principal goal
of spammers is to maximize exposure, the quantity of people
who view a link. Creating and analyzing the first Wikipedia
link spam corpus, we find that existing spam strategies per-
form quite poorly in this regard. The status quo spamming
model relies on link persistence to accumulate exposures,
a strategy that fails given the diligence of the Wikipedia
community. Instead, we propose a model that exploits the
latency inherent in human anti-spam enforcement.
Statistical estimation suggests our novel model would pro-
duce significantly more link exposures than status quo tech-
niques. More critically, the strategy could prove economi-
cally viable for perpetrators, incentivizing its exploitation.
To this end, we address mitigation strategies.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.5.3 [Group and Organization Interfaces]: collabora-
tive computing, computer-supported cooperative work ;
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection
Keywords
Web 2.0 spam, link spam, Wikipedia, wikis, collaborative
security, attack model, measurement study, spam economics.
1. INTRODUCTION
Wikipedia [13], the collaborative encyclopedia, is the 6th
most popular Internet site as of this writing [1], with its
English edition receiving 79 billion hits last year [15]. A
distinguishing feature of Wikipedia, and most public-facing
wikis, is that nearly all content can be modified by any par-
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ticipant. For Wikipedia this barrier-to-entry is effectively
zero – anonymous users are free to contribute.
Unsurprisingly, malicious users see this high popularity
and open infrastructure as an asset when mounting attacks.
Common forms of attack on Wikipedia include the insertion
of obscenities and the deletion of content. Recent years have
seen much work focused on detecting damaging changes to
Wikipedia [21, 22, 42, 43, 51]. However, this body of re-
search has largely ignored the placement of promotional or
otherwise inappropriate external links to Wikipedia. Such
behavior constitutes link spam – the focus of this paper. The
allure of such behaviors is obvious. Assuming a spammer can
convince a user to click on a spam link (i.e., click-through),
link spam could direct significant traffic to a landing site.
From visitors, the site can yield monetary or other benefits.
Wikipedia already has mechanisms in place to combat
such behavior. However, few of these mechanisms are au-
tomated, making it the responsibility of human editors to
monitor link additions. As Wikipedia’s popularity and rep-
utation continue to grow, so do the incentives for abuse [30].
Historically, Wikipedia has dealt with varying spam mod-
els. Before enabling HTML nofollow for outgoing links,
Wikipedia was often linked spammed for search-engine op-
timization (SEO) purposes [48]. In this manner, Wikipedia
links could garner indirect traffic for a landing site by accu-
mulating backlinks to improve search-engine rank.
Nowadays, spam models must have more direct intentions.
Thus, the principal goal of Wikipedia link spam is maximiz-
ing exposure, the quantity of people who view a spam link.
The status quo means of gaining exposure is to use subtle
tactics in the hope that a link can become persistent in an
article (i.e., have a long lifespan). We find the impact of this
strategy is minimal, with spam links receiving a median of
6 views before removal. This poor performance is a result of
Wikipedia’s diligent editors. Consequently, link spamming
models relying on persistence are not particularly successful.
This lack of success motivated us to research whether
more effective spam models might exist for Wikipedia and
wikis in general. To this end, we describe a spam model
that acknowledges and exploits the short lifespan of spam
links. The model maximizes link exposure by leveraging the
latency inherent in human anti-spam enforcement. Spam
campaigns based on our model leverage four attack vectors:
1. High-traffic placement: Using popular pages.
2. Registered accounts: Gaming the privilege delega-
tion system, accounts can be obtained that can edit
rapidly and in a programmatic fashion.
3. Blatant nature: Prominently placed/styled links
solicit reader attention and increase click-through.
4. Distributed: Distributed hosts provide the IP agility
needed to sustain spam attacks at scale.
Our work begins by examining Wikipedia’s existing anti-
spam infrastructure and producing/analyzing the first ever
Wikipedia link spam corpus. A measurement study reveals
much about status quo spam behaviors, but provides no ba-
sis for evaluating our novel spam model. Instead, we rely
on statistical estimation to demonstrate that the proposal
would outperform those techniques currently in use. Fur-
ther, economic analysis suggests the model might prove fi-
nancially viable for an attacker.
Given evidence that current anti-spam mechanisms are in-
sufficient, we propose detection strategies. While our analy-
sis concentrates on the English language Wikipedia, the vul-
nerabilities identified are likely present in other Wikipedia
editions, wiki software [6], and collaborative applications on
the whole. Thus, mitigating such threats holds enormous
importance for the survival of the collaborative paradigm.
The principal contributions of this work are:
1. Creating/analyzing the first Wikipedia spam corpus.
2. Identifying Wikipedia’s link spam vulnerabilities.
3. Proposing solutions to patch these vulnerabilities.
Moving forward, we provide background information and
review terminology (Sec. 2) before examining the status quo
of Wikipedia spam behaviors (Sec. 3). Then, we propose a
spam model and estimate its practical effectiveness (Sec. 4).
Finally, we propose mitigation strategies (Sec. 5), discuss
related work (Sec. 6), and conclude (Sec. 7).
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, preliminaries are handled. First, terminol-
ogy is standardized; both Wikipedia vocabulary (Sec. 2.1)
and spam-specific (Sec. 2.2). Then, the anti-spam tech-
niques employed by Wikipedia are examined (Sec. 2.3).
2.1 Wikipedia Terminology
Wikipedia [13] is a collaborative encyclopedia, whose con-
tent is composed of articles or pages. Individuals who cre-
ate/modify these articles are called contributors or editors.
Editors can be registered (have a username/password), or
choose to edit anonymously (with only their IP displayed).
Taken as a whole, the user-base is referred to as a commu-
nity. An article’s history consists of a series of versions, and
the individual changes introduced at each step are termed
revisions (often visualized as a diff). A revert occurs when
an editor restores a previous version of an article.
Articles may contain hypertext links to other content.
When an article links to an internal article, it is a wikilink.
Off-encyclopedia links are external links, which are the pri-
mary focus of this work. A syntax [16] defines external links,
and we investigate only well-formed links of this kind1.
2.2 Defining Wikipedia Link Spam
Put simply, a spam link is one that violates Wikipedia’s
(subjective) external link policy [16]. An objective definition
for external link spam on Wikipedia is beyond the scope of
this work. An external link can be inappropriate because of
either its destination, its presentation, or both.
Inappropriate destinations (URLs) are intuitive. Link-
ing for commercial or promotional purposes is prohibited.
Further, blogs, personal webpages, and fan sites usually
1Wikipedia “spam” is broader than well-formed external links.
URLs might be provided in plain-text or entire articles could be
commercially motivated. We do not study alternative strategies.
Figure 1: Pipeline for single-link spam detection
lack the credibility and notoriety necessary to justify link-
ing. A link’s presentation concerns its description text and
placement within an article. It should be emphasized that
Wikipedia spam need not be commercial in nature, rather,
it just must be undesirable traffic (and thus, analogous to
many definitions of email spam).
Fortunately, a precise definition of spam is unnecessary for
analysis. When building a spam corpus (Sec. 3.1), we lever-
age the power of community experts to make the spam/ham
distinction. When we propose a spam model (Sec. 4), we as-
sume the external links are unambiguously inappropriate.
2.3 How Wikipedia Mitigates Link Spam
Wikipedia has protections to prevent/detect external link
spamming. Mechanisms are classified at four granularity:
(1) single link, (2) account, (3) collective, and (4) bot.
An understanding of these protections is necessary to cap-
ture why the spam model of Sec. 4 is a viable threat. Dis-
cussion is Wikipedia-centric2, but other collaborative appli-
cations are likely to employ a subset of this functionality.
2.3.1 Single Link Mitigation
Entities involved in the removal of a single-link spam in-
stance are best visualized as a pipeline (see Fig. 1):
• Blacklists: URL blacklists are a preventative mecha-
nism that reject edits adding prohibited URLs. Both a
local and global blacklist are employed [12], containing
≈17k entries (regular expressions) in combination.
• Patrollers: The first human defenses are patrollers,
gate-keepers who monitor recent changes, usually with-
out regard for subject matter. Software tools [29, 49]
employing some prioritization mechanism often assist
in this process, although none have functionality spe-
cific to link spam detection.
• Watchlisters: Every Wikipedia user has a self se-
lected watchlist of articles and are notified when one
is modified. Given that an individual has indicated in-
terest in an article, one can presume they have some
incentive to ensure changes are beneficial.
• Readers: Spam edits passing the previous stages are
said to be embedded or persistent. Now, only readers
of an article are likely to encounter the damage. The
discoverer may choose not to undo the damage for rea-
sons of apathy, unfamiliarity with the editing system,
etc.. Anecdotal evidence suggests the average reader
is unlikely to fix the problem [23].
The spam model proposed in Sec. 4 assumes patrollers will
detect link spam additions and only places links to non-
blacklisted URLs (the list is publicly-viewable).
2We do not intend to provide a comprehensive explanation of
Wikipedia’s anti-spam mechanisms. Both generalizations and
omissions are made for the sake of succinctness and readability.
CORP SIZE CONTAINS
Cdamage 204k Edits that: (1) were rolled-back.
Cspam 4.7k
Edits that: (1) added exactly one
link, (2) were rolled-back, and
(3) passed manual inspection.
Cham 182k
Edits that: (1) added exactly one
link and (2) were not rolled-back.
Table 1: Summarizing project corpora
2.3.2 Account Mitigation
An account consistently demonstrating spam tendencies
will be blocked. When a user is caught making a damaging
edit, they are issued a warning. Subsequent damage gen-
erates sterner warnings, eventually leading to a block [29].
The spam model proposed in Sec. 4 is cognizant of this warn-
ing/blocking process. By adding links as rapidly as possible,
we take advantage of human latency – enabling one to have
insertedmany links before sufficient detections and warnings
have accumulated to warrant a block.
2.3.3 Collective Mitigation
A user may create multiple accounts or use multiple IP
addresses to evade blockage (“sock-puppets”). Similarly, dis-
tinct human users may collaborate for some malicious pur-
pose. Aside from manual signature detection, the checkuser
tool exists to detect these behaviors [7]. Checkuser’s can
investigate the IP addresses and user-agent strings that ac-
counts use to draw correlations and block entire IP ranges.
The spam model proposed in Sec. 4 stipulates that a broad
and sustained spam effort would require a large quantity of
diverse hosts (e.g., open proxies or a botnet) to have the IP
agility needed to avoid range blocks.
2.3.4 Bot Mitigation
Malicious script-driven bots pose a severe threat in wiki
environments. Such tools operate at zero marginal cost and
can outpace human users. Thus, methods are employed to
distinguish humans from bots. First, rate-limits are em-
ployed, and privileged accounts are allowed to edit at greater
speed. Second, CAPTCHAs are employed in sensitive situ-
ations. Third, there are a number of software extensions [7]
which claim protection against bot attackers.
Our spam model proposal (Sec. 4) employs autonomous
bots. However, by manipulating the privilege-granting sys-
tem, one can create accounts with high rate-limits that are
unaffected by software protections.
3. STATUS QUO OF WIKIPEDIA SPAM
Here, we seek to understand the status quo of Wikipedia
link spam behaviors. To this end, we create and analyze the
first ever Wikipedia link spam corpus. Analysis reveals an
abundance of subtle tactics, indicating a desire for persistent
(i.e., long-living) links. The efficiency of these strategies is
then measured, where efficiency is defined to be the number
of exposures a link receives before it is removed. We find
current techniques perform quite poorly in this regard.
Moving forward, the spam corpus is described (Sec. 3.1)
and used to analyze URL destinations (Sec. 3.2) as well as
the perpetrators (Sec. 3.3). Then, the impact and efficiency
of these spam instances is quantified (Sec. 3.4), before broad-
ening the search for efficient strategies (Sec. 3.5).
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Figure 2: Links by ODP [10] category
3.1 Creating a Link Spam Corpus
To build a link spam corpus, experienced Wikipedia users
are relied upon. A functionality called rollback (an expe-
dited form of revert) is delegated to trusted users and used
to undo “blatantly unproductive” contributions. Existing
work [51] describes how rollback can be detected and used
to flag damaging edits. Rollback-based labeling is advanta-
geous because it is: (1) autonomous, (2) performed by ex-
perts, and (3) allows a case-by-case definition of “damage.”
Edits flagged in this way contain diverse forms of damage,
and the link spam subset must be extracted. First, damag-
ing edits with exactly one external link addition are iden-
tified. Then, those revision diffs are manually inspected,
discarding edits where there are content changes besides the
link addition. Remaining revisions form the spam corpus.
Intuitively, we know these to be spam edits because the link
is the only change made, and therefore the decision to roll-
back the edit speaks directly to the inappropriateness of that
one link. We emphasize that links handled in this fashion
are not the result of simple editorial decisions, which would
not be a justifiable use of the rollback tool.
During 2 months of data collection in mid-2010 there were
7.4 million article-edits to English Wikipedia. Of these,
265k (3.59%) added at least one external link and 188k
(2.55%) added exactly one link. Of the 7.4 million edits,
204k (2.77%) were undone via rollback3 (forming corpus,
Cdamage). The intersection between “one-link-added” and
“rolled-back” sets is 6.1k revisions. After inspection4, 4,756
edits form corpus, Cspam . A complementary set, Cham , con-
tains “one-link-added” edits not undone via rollback.
Tab. 1 summarizes the project corpora. Corpora were
amassed by processing Wikipedia edits in real-time using
the STiki framework [49], built atop the MediaWiki API [5].
3.2 Link Spam Destinations
Analysis begins with the destinations (URLs) of Cspam .
First, destination genres are characterized and the most abu-
sive pages identified. Then, corpus links are correlated with
those from other spam-prone environments.
3.2.1 Genres of Spam Links
First, corpus domains are mapped to their Open Direc-
tory Project (OPD) [10] categorization, where available. Per
Fig. 2, observe that spam URLs encompass a breadth of cat-
egories. Unlike in other environments (e.g., email) where
spam typically has a narrow scope [34], Wikipedia spam
is diverse. Unsurprisingly, it is “business” sites which are
3Rollback actions were processed for one month after the last
corpus edit was made, giving editors time to vet/label content.
4Manual inspection at this scale is non-trivial. The “Oﬄine Re-
view Tool” included in [49] was authored/utilized for this task.
DESTINATION PROPERTY %-age
Commercial storefront 15.5%
Local directory or tourism 7.8%
Social media destinations 2.4%
Foreign language page 1.9%
Adult or offensive link 0.5%
PLACEMENT PROPERTY %-age
Link uncorrelated w/article 0.9%
Unusual link placement 0.9%
Visual manipulation of link 0.2%
Table 2: Characterizing spam edits
DOMAIN SPAM HAM SPAM-%
www.youtube.com 101 3058 3.2%
Area code look-up 72 11 86.7%
www.facebook.com 48 3294 1.5%
Cinematic rankings 41 8 83.6%
www.billboard.com 35 1340 2.6%
Soccer statistics 29 7 80.5%
Table 3: Domains w/most spam occurrences5
spammed the most relative to their ham quantity. This
ODP mapping, however, is too coarse. Thus, manual inves-
tigation was performed on 1,000 random edits from Cspam .
While a taxonomy of behaviors is beyond the scope of this
work, Tab. 2 shows the prevalence of several characteristics.
Profitability is central to any successful spam model [33].
Thus, it is surprising to see that only 15% of destinations
have product(s) immediately for sale. However, profit need
not be monetary, nor need it be earned directly. For exam-
ple, sites could earn referral commissions, monetize via ad
revenue, or fulfill some political/narcissistic agenda.
Nearly three-quarters of the corpus is unclassified in Tab. 2
because it is difficult to pinpoint the intention of a link/site.
A common tactic observed was “information adjacent ser-
vices.” For example, a site will provide encyclopedic infor-
mation (e.g., the science of LASIK eye surgery) but also
sell a related service (e.g., the surgery itself). This combi-
nation of self-interest and encyclopedic-interest complicates
our categorization. Similarly, such ambiguity would apply
to the Wikipedia editors who review these links.
The takeaway from this analysis is: (1) Wikipedia link
spam is categorically diverse, and (2) spammers may be at-
tempting to mask their malicious intentions. In this manner
(i.e., by being subtle), they hope their edits will not draw
attention and can become persistent on the page.
3.2.2 Link Presentation
Link placement is also analyzed (see Tab. 2). First, we
find the vast majority of spam links are topic-similar to the
Wikipedia articles on which they were placed. There is no
evidence of “blanket spamming.” Second, we find that spam-
mers are overwhelmingly adherent to link style conventions.
Guidelines require sources be placed in an “external links”
section near the article bottom or specially handled as an
in-line citation. In less than 1% of cases was this violated
(e.g., links atop an article). Equally rare were attempts to
manipulate link appearance (e.g., using a prominent font).
This adherence suggests spammers are attempting to gain
persistent links. After all, if spammers had short-term goals,
they would abandon subtlety and use prominently placed
and/or styled links to solicit reader attention and increase
click-through rates (as we propose in Sec. 4.1.3).
Figure 3: Geographical dist. of spamming IPs
3.2.3 Most Abusive URLs/Domains
It is intuitive to examine URLs/domains that appear mul-
tiple times in the spam corpus. Of the 4.7k members of
Cspam , there are 3.8k (80%) unique URLs and 2.3k (50%)
unique domains. Some domains are heavily linked, so a raw
count of spam occurrences can be misleading. For example,
www.billboard.com (an authoritative source in the music in-
dustry) had 35 spam occurrences, 5th most among domains,
but 1340 Cham occurrences. Clearly, it is more helpful to
examine spam-to-ham ratios. Tab. 3 shows raw counts and
these ratios for domains with the most spam incidents5.
Adding multiple links to a domain is an obvious way to
increase link exposure (and therefore, efficiency). However,
this behavior happens rarely – only 14 domains appear 10+
times in Cspam and 71% of domains appear just once. Fur-
ther, few of these domains have maximized their utility –
just 2 of the 25 “worst” domains are blacklisted.
3.2.4 Blacklist Correlations
Wikipedia uses purely internal mitigation mechanisms.
Therefore, to maximize utility, a malicious user might re-
use domains in multiple environments. To quantify this,
the correlation between Cspam and two URL blacklists was
measured in a real-time fashion: (1) Spamhaus’ DBL [9] (do-
mains in spam email bodies) and (2) Google’s Safe Browsing
lists [2, 45] (malware and phishing URLs).
Correlation was extremely poor. Of the 4.7k corpus links,
just 9 (0.19%) were DBL listed. The Safe Browsing lists
had 5 link matches (0.11%), all “malware.” The lack of cor-
relation is an indication that those conducting Wikipedia
spamming are unique from those involved in email spam.
3.3 Spam Perpetrators
We now analyze the editors that placed Cspam links. The
users’ registration status and geographic location are exam-
ined, before highlighting the most abusive individuals.
3.3.1 Registration Status & Location
57% of Cspam links were made anonymously (compared to
25% of Cham). Clearly, a majority of spammers are unaware
of the benefits extended to registered users (see Sec. 4.1.2).
IP-based spammers6 can be geo-located, as visualized in
Fig. 3. This distribution is consistent with both English-
speaking populations and regions commonly associated with
spam activity [34]. Thus, more fine-grained analysis of the
user-base is necessary before drawing conclusions.
5Some domains are not made explicit because: (1) they are not
well known, (2) they should not be discredited (it is impossible to
know who spammed them), and (3) to avoid additional exposure.
6Wikipedia does not disclose the IPs of registered users.
3.3.2 Repeat Offenders
Users adding multiple Cspam links are an intuitive point of
focus. For the 4.7k spam links there are 2.6k unique editors,
with 1.8k (70%) adding just one link and 47 users (1.8%)
adding 10+ spam instances. The single worst contributor
added 41 spam links, with little other account activity.
Poor contributors tend to spam exclusively one domain,
and the worst users map well onto the worst domains in
Tab. 3. Often, usernames are indicative of a conflict-of-
interest (COI) (i.e., the username matches the domain name,
verbatim). Such COIs make explicit an intuitive notion:
spam links are motivated by self-interest.
These repeat offenders present some of the strongest in-
dications of efficient behaviors. Many repeat offenders are
dedicated spam accounts, most of which maximized their
utility by spamming until blocked. However, as shown in
the next section, existing accounts still fail to optimize the
objective function: link exposures. In contrast to the effi-
cient accounts of our spam model, existing spam accounts
do not appear to be mechanized (see Sec. 4.1.2), as they add
links at speeds consistent with human operation.
3.4 Measuring Spam Impact
As our corpus demonstrates, some quantity of spam links
are added to Wikipedia. However, quantity is a poor mea-
sure of impact. Instead we measure: (1) spam survival time,
to gauge mitigation latency, and (2) spam exposures, to mea-
sure the efficiency of link spam efforts.
3.4.1 Spam Survival Time
When talking about the lifespan of a spam link (or dam-
age), it is the active duration which is of interest – the in-
terval when the link was visible in the most recent version
of an article. Fig. 4 visualizes the CDF of lifespans for both
Cspam and Cdamage edits. Spam edits have a median active
duration of ≈19 minutes (1164 seconds) which is an order of
magnitude larger than damaged edits, at 85 seconds (recall
that Cdamage contains all forms of poor behavior).
This gap in detection times is not unexpected. One gen-
erally inspects a revision via its diff. While text diffs
may capture obscenities and other forms of damage, only
the URL and hypertext are shown for external links. To
make a spam/ham distinction one must generally visit the
URL destination, a step which users might omit for reasons
of laziness or due to fears of malware/obscenity.
3.4.2 Spam Exposures
Link lifespan is not the ideal metric by which to measure
spam impact [44]. Links that reside on rarely visited pages
are of little worth, no matter their lifetime. Instead, the
quantity of link exposures is measured, a factor of: (1) the
link’s lifespan, and (2) the popularity of the article on which
it resided. Using hourly per-article statistics [11], we assume
uniform hourly distributions to produce view estimates.
Fig. 4 visualizes link exposure quantity. In the median
case, spam edits are viewed by 6.05 readers and damaged ed-
its receive 1.47 views. While a difference of over 3× between
types, neither figure is significant. Moreover, attempts to
isolate “effective strategies” (e.g., the most abusive users)
produced similar results.
We also note that the semantics of link exposure calcula-
tion overstate the efficiency of status quo techniques. The
calculation assumes that an article view is equivalent to
a link exposure, when in fact there is no guarantee that:
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Figure 4: CDF of views and lifespan for corpora.
Note the logarithmic scale for the x axis.
(1) the link graphically renders, or (2) the reader notices the
link. Recall that spam links tend to follow placement/style
conventions (Sec. 3.2.2). Thus, spam links are likely to be at
the page bottom (requiring scrolling) and appear adjacent
to other identically styled links (not drawing attention).
In contrast, our spam model proposes an aggressive link
placement/styling strategy (see Fig. 7 and Sec. 4.1.3), which
nearly ensures that an article view corresponds to reader fo-
cus on the link. Although difficult to quantify, these differ-
ences in strategy would presumably widen the efficiency gap
between the current and proposed models.
3.5 Expanding the Investigation’s Scope
In the past sections, many aspects of Cspam and related
corpora have been examined. However, our corpus encom-
passes only a two-month period, and we cannot be certain
that it is representative. Therefore, we now explore alterna-
tive sources for Wikipedia spam information.
3.5.1 On-wiki Archives
The archived Wikipedia/Wikimedia blacklist discussion
pages [12] and a special task force [14] are the best source
regarding historical Wikipedia spam behaviors. Much as
corpus analysis revealed, problematic domains and accounts
are not unusual – but more aggressive strategies are. There
is occasional mention of automated spambots, but most in-
cidents occurred before current protection settings.
3.5.2 Media Coverage
One would expect that an attack of sufficient scale would
capture the attention of the security community. Though
Wikipedia has been an element (phished) in attacks, no pub-
lication makes mention of direct spam events.
3.5.3 Deleted Revisions
The RevDelete [7] software tool is used to remove revi-
sions from public view (including histories). There are legit-
imate reasons for deletions, copyright violations and libelous
content among them. We were motivated to investigate if
spam attacks might be hidden from public view in this man-
ner, as this might prevent copy-cat attacks.
For 6 weeks in late 2010, we stored diffs for every revision
to Wikipedia. This enabled us to view revisions that later
appeared on a public block log or exhaustive API [5] requests
revealed to be “suppressed” (a stronger, non-logged form of
removal). Manual inspection of 2.6k deletions revealed no
evidence of spam behaviors (see [52] for what was found).
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PVd TITLE
106k Wiki
93k United States
61k 2010 Deaths
60k Justin Bieber
58k YouTube
(a)
PVs TITLE DATE
154 The Who 02-07
73 Hockey . . . 2010 02-24
55 Dennis Gabor 06-05
51 Pete Townshend 02-07
49 Corey Haim 03-10
(b)
Table 4: (a) Most avg. page-views/day (PVd).
(b) Peak page-views/sec. (PVs), hour buckets.
Both calculated for Jan. through Aug. 2010
4. SPAM MODEL & ATTACK VECTORS
With the last section providing no evidence of efficient or
aggressive link spam behaviors, it could be the case that
existing anti-spam mechanisms are a sufficient deterrent to
attacks. While subtle and persistence-seeking behaviors may
not prove viable against these protections, we hypothesize
that vulnerabilities are present and can be exploited. In this
section, we describe a novel and efficient spam model we
estimate can significantly outperform status quo techniques.
The responsibility of spam mitigation on Wikipedia falls
primarily to human users. While Wikipedia’s editor commu-
nity may be adept at detecting subtle link spam strategies,
they do have a weakness: inherent human latency. Even
under ideal conditions it takes several seconds for a human
to scan an edit diff, visit a link URL, make a spam deter-
mination, and complete the revert process. Such short link
durations are unhelpful when using subtle spam strategies.
However, by embracing these finite windows of opportunity
one can deploy an aggressive spam model capable of pro-
ducing a large number of exposures. Moreover, latency will
compound over multiple link additions before blacklist or
account-level protections can be enacted.
We first describe the attack vectors (Sec. 4.1), before esti-
mating their practical effectiveness (Sec. 4.2). Then, ethical
issues of our presentation are discussed (Sec. 4.3).
4.1 Attack Vectors
There are four attack vectors which define our model:
First, high-traffic pages are targeted at opportune times
(Sec. 4.1.1). Second, privileged accounts are attained and
operated autonomously (Sec. 4.1.2). Third, link additions
are styled/placed to increase click-through (Sec. 4.1.3). Fi-
nally, use of distributed hosts enables evasion (Sec. 4.1.4).
We recognize that these vectors have been seen previously
in other domains (e.g., email, social networks [47]). Unique
is the mapping of these strategies into a wiki setting, with its
functional peculiarities and community-driven mitigation.
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Figure 6: View distribution by UTC hour-of-day
4.1.1 Targeting Popular Entities
Spam links are often quickly detected (per Fig. 4). This
detection speed suggests patrollers discover them. Thus, re-
gardless of where the link was placed, it likely would have
been discovered equally as quickly. To maximize link expo-
sures in a fixed duration, one should target: (1) the most
popular articles; (2) during peak-traffic.
Popular Articles: As of this writing, Wikipedia averages
15 million hourly views over its 3.4 million articles [15]. If
these views were uniformly distributed, Wikipedia would be
a less than ideal spamming environment. Instead, as Fig. 5
shows, the distribution is approximately Zipfian.
Thus, large numbers of readers can be reached by target-
ing few articles. Tab. 4a displays the most popular pages
on average, revealing several articles that consistently re-
ceive 50k+ hits per day. Tab. 4b shows peak traffic events.
Often, these spikes are tied to cultural events. For exam-
ple, musical act “The Who” and member “Pete Townshend”
played the 2010 Super Bowl halftime show; exactly when
the associated articles were receiving 200+ views a second.
These high view rates are at the core of the proposed at-
tack. As Fig. 5 and Tab. 4 show, several seconds could be
sufficient to accumulate a large number of link exposures,
per edit. When multiple edits are made in the course of a
campaign their sum could be immense. It should be noted
that many popular pages are placed under “protection” [17]
on Wikipedia. However, the account-level vulnerabilities de-
scribed in Sec. 4.1.2 render these protections ineffective7.
Peak Traffic Periods: An intelligent attacker will not just
target the most popular pages, he/she will target them at
the most opportune times. Fig. 6 visualizes Wikipedia’s
readership by hour-of-day. On the average, peak traffic is
achieved on weekdays around 2:00 UTC.
4.1.2 Account Privileges & Autonomy
Here, we describe the illicit advantages of using privileged
accounts and how one can autonomously attain these privi-
leges. Having such accounts, we discuss how one could max-
imize their utility using mechanized operation.
Privileged Benefits: While anonymous editing (identified
only by IP address) has a low barrier-to-entry, registered
accounts offer both speed and economic benefits to a spam-
mer. Two access-levels [18] are of interest, anonymous and
autoconfirmed, which are compared in Tab. 5.
7Accounts cannot edit“fully-protected”pages, which are very rare
(i.e., the “Main Page”). We exclude such pages from analysis.
ACCT. RATE CAPTCHA CRITERIA
anonymous
≈ 8 edits
per min.
At every link
add.
None
auto-
confirmed
70+ ed-
its/min.
One at acct.
creation
Acct. 4+
days old; has
10+ edits
Table 5: Comparing account criteria/privileges
CAPTCHA solves inhibit spammer behavior by: (1) lim-
iting their speed of operation and/or (2) generating cost
for solutions [39]. Notice that an autoconfirmed user must
solve only one CAPTCHA and can do at an insensitive time.
Experiments in Wikipedia’s sandbox also revealed that
autoconfirmed accounts have advantageous rate-limits.
While anonymous users are limited to ≈8 edits/minute, rates
of 70+ edits/minute were achieved with autoconfirmed ac-
counts. Further, this does not appear to be a hard limit,
but the result of network bottlenecks/latency.
Finally, edits made by registered users are viewed less sus-
piciously. For example, software inspection tools [3, 49] tend
to give edits made by anonymous users higher review prior-
ity. Further, Goldman [30] writes about how IP users are
treated as “second-class citizens.”
Becoming Autoconfirmed: While attaining the auto-
confirmed privilege has benefits, one must reach this status
by having 10+ edits and being 4+ days old. When these
criteria are met, software will automatically grant the privi-
lege. While the time interval is trivial to overcome, not just
any 10 edits will suffice, as multiple poor edits could lead
to blockage (see Sec. 2.3.2). However, this process can be
simplified or evaded in multiple ways.
First, few namespaces are heavily vetted for quality. Dis-
cussion pages, user profiles, and sandboxes receive little-to-
none of the monitoring of encyclopedic content. Nonethe-
less, edits in these spaces still count towards an account’s to-
tal and it is not difficult to imagine how automated scripts
might be able to accumulate edits in such settings. Sec-
ond, even if Wikipedia were to constrain the namespaces for
such counts, one could imagine malicious users authoring
helpful Wikipedia bots to bring malicious accounts to au-
toconfirmed status. Such bots might perform menial yet
constructive tasks (e.g., spelling correction).
Mechanized Editing: The ability to launch attacks in a
mechanical fashion is a powerful one. This is a core vulner-
ability: Wikipedia relies on humans for mitigation but edits
can be placed at greater-than-human speeds. In particular,
once a spam campaign is initiated, it is logical for it to edit
as quickly as possible until some resource is exhausted (i.e.,
the account blocked, or the URL blacklisted).
Sec. 2.3.2 discussed that an account is generally blocked
after some quantity, x, of damaging edits are detected. An
account could methodically place x spam links and then
await blockage. Alternatively, by editing rapidly, one ex-
ploits the human latency of the detection process. In the
time it takes x spam instances to be located and a block
enacted, some additional quantity of links can be added.
Mechanization is enabled via the MediaWiki API [5]. Fur-
ther, anti-bot protections (Sec. 2.3.4) were found insufficient
against mechanized attacks. The protections failed in both
sandbox experiments and in tests against an identically con-
figured local MediaWiki [6] installation.
Figure 7: Mock-up of link placement/style
4.1.3 Content Placement & Styling
Wikipedia policy states that hyperlinks should be placed
in an “external links” section near the bottom of an arti-
cle and use the default font. This placement and styling is
not ideal to solicit reader attention. Instead, links could be
prominently located (i.e., atop the article) and typeset (i.e.,
large and colorful), as demonstrated in Fig. 7.
Intuitively, such blatant presentation should improve click-
through rates. Since the attack model assumes that the
initial patroller(s) will undo spam edits – and only intends
to exploit their latency, not deceive/delay them – it is un-
likely such techniques will hasten link removal. While the
rendered content is obviously abusive (see Fig. 7), the wiki
syntax generating it is less straightforward:
<p style="font-size:5em;font-weight:bolder">
[http://www.example.com Example link]</p>.
Since patrollers inspect text diffs, this markup could be dif-
ficult for them to interpret (especially non-technical users).
Further, CSS is widely used in Wikipedia and does not ap-
pear anomalous. Moreover, the ability to add/modify con-
tent at arbitrary positions is fundamental to the wiki model.
4.1.4 Distributed Evasion
In order to sustain an attack, a large number of accounts
would be necessary. If accounts all operate from the same
IP address/range, then the checkuser tool (Sec. 2.3.3) could
discover this correlation. As a result, account registration
could be prohibited and accounts proactively blocked.
The need for a large and diverse pool of IP hosts is not
unique to our model (e.g., consider email spam and DOS at-
tacks). Similarly, the methods of acquiring and using such
addresses need not be novel. Wikipedia has protections
against anonymity networks (e.g., Tor) and open proxies,
leaving botnets as a likely distribution agent.
4.2 Estimating Model Effectiveness
Since Sec. 3 showed the proposed vectors were not in ac-
tive use, it is impossible to passively gleam exposure statis-
tics. Thus, we proceed via estimation, a non-trivial task
given the model’s dependence on human reactions. Provided
this, it is not our intention to arrive at exacting predictions.
Instead, we seek only to show that the proposal: (1) would
outperform status quo models, (2) poses a legitimate threat,
and (3) could prove economically viable.
Here, we proceed by first estimating administrative re-
sponses to the spam model (Sec. 4.2.1), before handling
those of casual readers (Sec. 4.2.2). Then, we discuss the
model’s economic implications (Sec. 4.2.3).
4.2.1 Administrative Response
We conduct analysis at account granularity (i.e., a cam-
paign of edits) and are concerned primarily with active du-
ration. That is, how long do links last? And how long do
accounts/URLs survive before blockage/blacklisting?
Conservatively assume an account and all of its links are
removed exactly 1 minute after the campaign is initiated. In
that 1 minute, rate-limits would permit 70 links to be placed
on popular Wikipedia pages. Using Fig. 5, we estimate that
≈1300 readers would see a link during this 1 minute (assum-
ing the last link added would be visible for only a fraction of
a second). In practice, even after a campaign is blocked, its
links may remain active on the site. Although editors may
work rapidly to undo this damage, they must contend with
the same network latency as the attacker. If 70 links were
to last for 1 minute each, ≈2100 active views would occur.
We believe that campaign durations on the order of 1–2
minutes are a reasonable (albeit cautious) estimation. Fig. 4
showed that “damaging edits” – often blatant acts of vandal-
ism – survived 85 seconds in the median case. Further, these
are only single links, not an entire campaign of edits with a
necessary administrative response: while anyone can remove
a link, only privileged users can actually halt link additions.
Clearly the proposed model outperforms the 6 viewer me-
dian (per link) observed in the status quo corpus (Sec. 3).
Just 2–3 seconds on the most popular pages would equal
this total. One minute of exposure would produce an aver-
age of 30 views for 70 links/pages, not to mention the higher
click-through rates due to prominent placement/style.
4.2.2 Viewer Response
We expect that most exposures would occur during a link’s
active duration. However, there are alternative ways link
views could occur. As [30] observes, Wikipedia content is
frequently scraped or used in mashup-like applications. If
an article version containing a spam link were obtained in
such a fashion, it could become a source of exposure/traffic.
Probably more significant are watchlisters, who receive no-
tification whenever a page of interest is edited. While a link
may no longer be“active”, watchlists will point to changes in
version histories. Such“inactive”exposures could prove non-
trivial. For perspective, the “Wiki” article has some 2,000
watchlisters. Also realize that to garner watchlist traffic, a
link edit need not survive for any meaningful duration.
From the attacker’s perspective, it is important to convert
viewers into landing site visitors. Initially, one would expect
high click-through rates due to novelty. Sustained attacks,
however, would desensitize readers and click-through rates
might converge to those in familiar domains. For example,
[33] reported a click-through rate of 0.71% in their economic
study of email spam. Using this, we estimate that campaigns
could consistently produce at least 15–20 landing site visits.
4.2.3 Economic Considerations
The low-barriers to entry of Wikipedia invite a diversity
of spam types (Sec. 3.3). Thus, it should be emphasized that
the notion of “profiting” from a spam campaign need not be
monetary. However, for the sake of economic discussion, we
now make precisely that assumption. We begin by consider-
ing the costs of mounting campaigns. As Kanich et al. [33]
note, dedicated spammers are likely to participate in an af-
filiate program. This removes the burden of business costs
(inventory, shipping, etc.) and web hosting, while typically
returning commissions of 40-50%.
If we assume a spammer already has a distribution infras-
tructure available (i.e., botnet), this leaves three expenses:
(1) A CAPTCHA must be solved at account creation, whose
third-party solutions cost as little as $1 per thousand [39].
(2) Domain names must be purchased and replaced if black-
listing occurs, at a cost of $1–$2 each (depending on TLD).
(3) Attack scripts must be coded, incurring labor costs. Us-
ing available API frameworks, a straightforward implemen-
tation can be encoded in < 100 lines of code.
Thus, marginal costs could be as little as $1 per campaign
(assuming domains cannot be re-used). The larger question
is whether these costs can be recouped to produce a positive
return-on-investment (ROI). Extrapolating from a measure-
ment study of a “male enhancement pharmacy” [33], the
20 anticipated landing site visitors would have an expected
revenue of $5.20. Even after affiliate profit-sharing, this sum
exceeds the marginal cost, yielding a profit and non-trivial
ROI. These anecdotal figures should be interpreted only as
an indication that this threat could be viable.
Given this finding, why is the proposed spam model not
already in active use? First, there is the possibility that we
have introduced previously unknown vectors. This would
make proactive mitigation techniques especially pertinent
(Sec. 5). More likely, the profits are simply less than those
found in other domains. Consider that a single botnet can
send 1 billion spam emails per day [33]. In comparison,
English Wikipedia has only had half-a-billion edits in its 10
year history. The massive scale at which decentralized email
spam models operate render them far more profitable (in an
absolute sense) than possible in a targeted and centralized
environment. However, we do not believe this renders our
proposal irrelevant. The minimal startup costs and technical
simplicity of our model may attract certain attackers.
4.3 Ethical Considerations
It is in no way this research’s intention to facilitate damage
to Wikipedia or any wiki host. The vulnerabilities discussed
in this section have been disclosed to Wikipedia’s parent
organization, the Wikimedia Foundation (WMF). Further,
the WMF was notified regarding the publication schedule of
this document and offered technical assistance.
In Sec. 5 mitigation strategies are discussed. Straightfor-
ward configuration changes and refinement of the privilege-
granting system would significantly improve defenses. More-
over, we have independently developed the most technically
challenging of our suggestions, a signature-based machine-
learning framework [50]. A live implementation of this tech-
nique is currently operational on English Wikipedia.
5. PREVENTION & MITIGATION
Having exposed potentially viable attack vectors against
wikis and Wikipedia, we believe it prudent to propose so-
lutions. Three proposals are discussed: the notion of ex-
plicit edit approval (Sec. 5.1), refinement of account privi-
leges (Sec. 5.2), and signature-based detection (Sec. 5.3).
While the first suggestion artificially increases attack la-
tency so that human editors can vet contributions, the latter
two proposals aim to remove this burden from humans en-
tirely. Machine-driven detection seems especially pertinent
given Goldman’s [30] claims of a dwindling labor-force.
However, Wikipedia’s community is hesitant of changes
that threaten usability and the open-editing model. There-
fore, the community’s willingness to integrate security mech-
anisms with its philosophies may prove critical.
5.1 Explicit Approval
Given that the spam model targets human latency, an
obvious suggestion is to delay contributions from going live
until patrollers can inspect them. Indeed, this is a valid
proposal to prevent all damaging contributions, and is called
“Pending Changes” or “Flagged Revisions” [24].
The proposal is a controversial one [8], with concerns
regarding: (1) usability (“why don’t my edits appear?”),
(2) the creation of class hierarchy, (3) manpower [30], and
(4) coverage. Implementing such treatment for autocon-
firmed users seems highly unlikely. It is more realistic that
only suspicious link-adding edits on the most popular pages
(see Fig. 5 and Sec. 5.3) could be handled in this fashion.
5.2 Privilege Configuration
As Sec. 4.1.2 showed, autoconfirmed accounts have ex-
pansive permissions yet are easy to obtain. An obvious de-
fense focus is refining the privilege-granting system.
Simply increasing the thresholds for autoconfirmed status
(i.e., requiring >10 edits) seems unwise. Given that certain
namespaces are not well-monitored, such a change would be
of little consequence. Even if edit counts were constrained to
well-vetted content (i.e., the article namespace), it was dis-
cussed that malicious users could still autonomously appear
human-like by making trivial but helpful edits (Sec. 4.1.2).
Alternatively, edit count could be replaced by more fine-
grained and quantitative measures [27].
More simply, it would seem helpful to modify the permis-
sions of autoconfirmed users. It is excessive that accounts
can edit at rates exceeding 70 edits/min. – inconsistent with
human operating speeds. Constructive “bots” have a dedi-
cated permission and approvals process. Human-users expe-
dited by software tools could undergo a similar, manually-
delegated procedure. Consider that if autoconfirmed users
were limited to 5 edits/min., it would render the attack 15×
less useful than under the current configuration.
5.3 Signature-Based Detection
Given that the spam model is blatant and aggressive in na-
ture, signature-based detection is a logical mitigation choice.
Such a system is described and implemented in our recent
work [50]. Summarily, a machine-learning framework is used
to score the “spam potential” of edits in real-time. Poorly
scoring edits can be undone automatically (per community
set false-positive tolerances), used to prioritize patrollers’ ef-
forts [49], or require explicit approval (as in Sec. 5.1). The
technique has been brought live for English Wikipedia and
could be easily ported to other languages/projects.
The feature set includes: (1) Wikipedia metadata process-
ing, (2) HTML landing site analysis (including the quantifi-
cation of “commercial intent” [25, 41]), and (3) third-party
data (e.g., from web crawlers [1]). Most importantly, the
attack vectors described herein are quantified as features.
However, because the attack vectors are not in active use
(and not captured in the training corpus), static rules are
installed to bring these features into force.
Over subtle status quo behaviors our system detected 64%
of spam at a 0.5% FP-rate [50]. It is intuitive that the easiest
spam instances to detect are those employing blatant strate-
gies – meaning that the spam model proposed herein could
be detected with even greater confidence. Moving forward,
system development intends to target deeper URL/domain
analysis (see [26, 37]), given that the need for non-blacklisted
domains forms a significant portion of marginal attack cost.
6. RELATED WORK
Related literature is best divided into two categories:
(1) damage to Wikipedia (Sec. 6.1), and (2) spam in non-
wiki collaborative applications (Sec. 6.2).
6.1 Damage to Wikipedia
While Wikipedia link spam has long been considered a
subset of “damaging edits” [44], researchers have tended to
ignore link spam when analyzing and building damage de-
tection systems [21, 22, 42, 43, 51]. As a result, link spam
mitigation relies heavily on human-driven detection.
While less prevalent in the status quo, link spam edits
are more interesting than other damaging edits because of
their potential financial motives. The potential for profit
has not gone unnoticed [30, 36]. Similarly, SEO proponents
have described how one might reap these benefits, publishing
guides [4] on how to attain persistent Wikipedia links.
6.2 Spam in Collaborative Applications
Wikipedia is the archetype of the wiki model, the most
generalized example of a collaborative application. Recent
history has seen the emergence of collaborative functionality
and user-generated content in web environments. As Hey-
mann et al. [32] survey, these features lead to a significant
amount of link spam inWeb forums [40], blog comments [20],
and social networks [28]. Similarly, there are varied pro-
posals on how to mitigate spam in such domains [20, 31,
38]. However, wiki environments are distinct from these
systems. For example, wikis allow arbitrary content place-
ment/deletion and have community mitigation.
XRumer [19] is blackhat SEO software that broadly tar-
gets collaborative functionality (including wikis) by discov-
ering and auto-completing web forms [39, 46]). Anecdo-
tally [35], XRumer is thought to be a significant source of
web spam. However, XRumer’s goal is backlink accumula-
tion, not direct click-throughs. As a result, XRumer empha-
sizes link quantity, rather than targeting environments.
The work most similar to our own pertains to social net-
works. Much as our proposal targets high-traffic Wikipedia
articles, [47] investigates social “hubs” – user’s with popu-
lar profiles and high connectivity. By exploiting the lack of
access-control, the researchers posted content to these pro-
files and attained a large number of exposures. While [47]
examines DDOS and botnet C&C via this channel, it is easy
to imagine how it could be re-purposed for link spam.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we conducted the first systematic study of
link spam on Wikipedia. This revealed that the status quo
strategy of spammers is the use subtle techniques in the
hope of attaining persistent links. However, the diligence of
Wikipedia’s community mitigates this strategy, as the links
receive few exposures (i.e., views) before they are reverted.
While the Wikipedia community is capable of detecting
even subtle spam behaviors, it has a weakness – the inher-
ent human latency with which it mitigates spam links. In
this paper, we described a novel spam model that exploits
this latency by using aggressive techniques to maximize re-
source utility in these brief windows of opportunity. The
model is characterized by the targeting of popular articles,
use of mechanized accounts, attention-grabbing link place-
ment/style, and distributed hosting.
Unable to passively evaluate the effectiveness of the model,
we instead relied on statistical estimation. While precise
estimates are beyond the scope of this work, our analysis
revealed that the proposed strategy would: (1) outperform
status quo spam techniques, (2) cause significant disruption
to the encyclopedia, and (3) could prove financially viable
to an attacker, motivating sustained attacks at scale.
To this end, we offered solutions on how the vulnerabilities
might be patched. Simple configuration changes would have
significant impact. Beyond that, we have implemented a
signature-driven detection engine which is autonomous and
operates in real-time, eliminating the human latency so crit-
ical to the proposed spam model’s success.
How collaborative and wiki applications embrace this re-
sult is significant. While our analysis has focused on En-
glish Wikipedia, there are other high-traffic targets which
could sustain attacks. The willingness of these communities
to embrace software protections over human-driven enforce-
ment may have important ramifications for the security of
these sites and the collaborative paradigm as whole.
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